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We study resource allocation in the face of uncertain needs. We extend Young
(1987)’s parametric rules to the uncertain context. We re-establish the axiomatic char-
acterization of parametric rules and show the optimality of the rules.
1 Setting
A single and perfectly divisible resource is to be divided among a group of agents. Agents
are denoted by elements in the set N of natural numbers. Let N be the set of all finite
subsets of N. An agent’s uncertain need, called a claim, of the resource is modeled as a
cumulative distribution function with its support a closed interval on R+. Let F be the set
of possible claims. For each i ∈ N, we denote by Fi ∈ F a typical claim of agent i, and
ci and Ci the maximal and minimal values in the support of Fi. Note that ci is the amount
of the resource that agent i needs for sure, and is called the sure need of agent i; Ci is
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the maximal amount of the resource that agent i would possibly need, and is called the
maximal need of agent i.
An allocation problem is a pair (F,T ), where F ∈ F I is a list of claims that are
indexed by some I ∈ N , and T ∈ R+ is the total endowment to be allocated. A solution of
the problem is a vector t ∈ RI+ such that
∑
ti ≤ T and 0 ≤ ti ≤ Ci for all i ∈ I. An original
feature of this model is that we allow the endowment not to be fully allocated. As argued
in Long, Sethuraman, Xue (2019), when agents have uncertain satiation points, it may not
be desirable to fully allocate the resource. Whether and to what extent agents should be
satiated are hence questions to be answered.
We denote by PI the set of problems with population I. An allocation rule is a function
r that assigns to every problem with any finite population a solution. For each I ∈ N , each
(F,T ) ∈ PI , and each i ∈ I, we denote by ri(F,T ) agent i’s assignment given by r.
2 Parametric rules
In the bankruptcy/rationing literature where agents have deterministic claims, the class
of so-called parametric rules is introduced and characterized by Young (1987). This is
an important class since it unifies all rules satisfying some basic axioms with a general
parametric representation. Replacing deterministic claims with abstract types for agents’
characteristics, the same class of rules is formulated and characterized by Kaminski (2000,
2006). The types of our agents are simply their (uncertain) claims. Below we adapt their
definition of parametric rules to our setting.
Parametric rules: Let α, α ∈ R ∪ {−∞,∞} be such that α < α. A function f : F ×
[α, α] → R is called a parametric function if for each Fi ∈ F , f (Fi, ·) is non-decreasing
and continuous with f (Fi, α) = 0 and f (Fi, α) ≤ Ci. For each parametric function f , define
r f as follows. For each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each j ∈ I,
r fj (F,T ) := f (F j, α
∗), whereα∗ ∈ [α, α] satisfies
∑
f (Fi, α∗) = min{T,
∑
f (Fi, α)}.
We call r f the parametric rule with the parametric function f .
The key difference between our definition and that of Young (1987) and Kaminski
(2000, 2006) is that each of our parametric rules determines, in addition to a parametric
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way of rationing, a maximal assignment for each agent. Specifically, for each Fi ∈ F ,
we allow f (Fi, α), the maximal assignment of agent i, to be any amount no larger than his
maximal need Ci. Thus, our parametric rules associated with different parametric func-
tions choose different maximal assignments for agents. In contrast, both Young (1987) and
Kaminski (2000, 2006) require the maximal assignment of an agent to be an exogenously
fixed amount that depends only on the agent’s type, not chosen by rules. Moreover, we
further modify their definition by requiring the sum of agents’ assignments in a problem to
be either the endowment or the sum of agents’ maximal assignments, whichever is smaller.
3 Characterization
We extend some familiar axioms to our setting. The first axiom, symmetry, is a reflection
of Aristotle’s famous principle “equal treatment of equals”.
Symmetry: For each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each i, j ∈ I, if Fi = F j, then
ri(F,T ) = r j(F,T ).
The second axiom, continuity, requires that small changes in a problem not lead to large
changes in the chosen allocation. We adopt the same convergence concept as in Long,
Sethuraman, and Xue (2019). For each i ∈ N,each Fi ∈ F , and each sequence {Fni }∞n=1 of
elements of F , we say that Fni converges to Fi if Fni converges weakly to Fi, lim cni = ci,
and limCni = Ci. For each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each sequence {(Fn,T n)}∞n=1 of
elements of PI , we say that (Fn,T n) converges to (F,T ), denoted by (Fn,T n) → (F,T ), if
for each i ∈ I, Fni converges to Fi, and limT n = T .
Continuity: For each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each sequence {(Fn,T n)}∞n=1 of elements
of PI , if (Fn,T n)→ (F,T ), then lim r(Fn,T n) = r(F,T ).
A weakening of continuity, endowment continuity, is obtained by considering only
small changes of the endowment.
Endowment continuity: For each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each sequence {(F,T n)}∞n=1
of elements of PI , if limT n = T , then lim r(F,T n) = r(F,T ).
Our last axiom, consistency, formulates an invariance principle that has played a cen-
tral role in resource allocation with a variable population. In our uncertain setting, since
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endowment is not necessarily exhausted, there are two reasonable ways in specifying the
amount to be divided among the remaining agents. The endowment in the reduced problem
could be the sum of the amounts initially assigned to the remaining agents, or the difference
between the initial endowment and the sum of the assignments to the agents who leave. We
require the invariance principle to hold in both cases.
Consistency: For each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each J ⊆ I,
rJ(F,T ) = r(FJ,
∑
j∈J




where rJ(F,T ) and FJ are, respectively, the restriction of r(F,T ) and F onto J.
Remember that a question unique to our setting is that when and how an endowment
should be used only partially. In defining parametric rules, we impose a maximum as-
signment for each agent, require each of them to get his maximum when the endowment
is greater than the total maximum, and require the resource to be exhausted when the en-
dowment cannot meet all the maximum. The following result, first presented in Long,
Sethuraman, and Xue (2019), shows that, surprisingly, a combination of the above axioms
implies these same natural properties.
Lemma 1. ( Long, Sethuraman, and Xue (2019)) Let r be a symmetric, endowment contin-
uous, and consistent rule. Then there is a function M : F → R+ such that for each I ∈ N ,
each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each i ∈ I, (1) T < ∑M(F j)=⇒∑r j(F,T ) = T and ri(F,T ) ≤ M(Fi),
and (2) T ≥ ∑M(F j)=⇒ri(F,T ) = M(Fi).
A further implication of Lemma 1 is that a rule satisfying the axioms in our setting can
be think of as doing two separate things. First it determines maximum, and then it deter-
mines how to rationing when the endowment cannot meet all the maximum. Combining
Lemma 1 and the result of Kanmiski, 2002, we can characterize the parametric rules.
Theorem 1. A rule is symmetric, continuous, and consistent if and only if it is a parametric
rule with a continuous parametric function.
In order to prove the theorem, we first define a metric on F and prove that the corre-
sponding metric space is separable.
Let Q+ be the set of non-negative rational numbers. A claim is a Borel probability
measure on R+, represented by a CDF. We assume that each claim has a compact support.
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Let Fi denote a typical claim, and ci and Ci the minimal and the maximal values of the
support of Fi. Let F be the set of such claims. Define d : F → R by setting for each pair
Fi, F j ∈ F ,
d(Fi, F j) := dLP(Fi, F j) + |ci − c j| + |Ci −C j|,
where dLP is the Le´vy-Prokhorov metric on the set of Borel probability measures on R. It
can be readily seen that d is a metric on F .
Lemma 2. The metric space (F , d) is separable.
Proof. For each pair r1, r2 ∈ Q+ with r1 < r2, let F [r1,r2] := {Fi ∈ F : [ci,Ci] ⊆ [r1, r2]}.
Since the set of Borel probability measures on R equipped with the Le´vy-Prokhorov metric
dLP is separable, and since each subspace of a separable metric space is separable, for each
pair r1, r2 ∈ Q+ with r1 < r2, the metric space (F [r1,r2], dLP) is separable. Thus, there is a
countable dense subset of F [r1,r2], denoted byD[r1,r2]. LetD := ⋃
r1,r2∈Q+:r1<r2
D[r1,r2]. It can be
readily seen thatD is countable andD ⊆ F .
We show that D is dense in (F , d). Let Fi ∈ F and  > 0. We need to show that there
is F j ∈ D such that d(Fi, F j) < . Let r1 ∈ Q+ ∩ [ci − 4 , ci] and r2 ∈ Q+ ∩ (Ci,Ci + 4 ).
Then r1 ≤ ci ≤ Ci < r2, and thus, Fi ∈ F [r1,r2]. Since Fi ∈ F [r1,r2] and D[r1,r2] is dense in
(F [r1,r2], dLP), there is a sequence {Fn}∞n=1 of elements ofD[r1,r2] such that limn→∞ dLP(Fi, Fn) =
0. Let xi ∈ (ci, ci + 4 ) and x′i ∈ (Ci − 4 ,Ci) be such that Fi is continuous at xi and x′i . Since
weak convergence of probability measures on R is equivalent to convergence in the metric
dLP, and since lim
n→∞ dLP(Fi, Fn) = 0 and Fi is continuous at xi and x
′






i). Since xi > ci and x
′
i < Ci, Fi(xi) > 0 and Fi(x
′
i) < 1. Thus, there
is N ∈ N such that for each n ≥ N, Fn(xi) > 0, Fn(x′i) < 1, and thus, cn ≤ xi < ci + 4
and Cn ≥ x′i > Ci − 4 . Since for each n ∈ N, Fn ∈ D[r1,r2], cn ≥ r1 ≥ ci − 4 and
Cn ≤ r2 < Ci + 4 . Thus, for each n ≥ N, cn ∈ [ci − 4 , ci + 4 ) and Cn ∈ (Ci − 4 ,Ci + 4 ),
and hence, |ci − cn| ≤ 4 and |Ci − Cn| ≤ 4 . Moreover, since limn→∞ dLP(Fi, Fn) = 0, there is
N′ ∈ N such that for each n ≥ N′, dLP(Fi, Fn) < 2 . Let j ≥ max{N,N′}. Then d(Fi, F j) =
dP(Fi, F j) + |ci − c j| + |Ci −C j| < 2 + 4 + 4 = , as desired.
Now we prove Theorem 1.
Proof. Let r be a symmetric, continuous, and consistent rule. By Lemma 1, there is a




M(F j) ⇒ ∑ r j(F,T ) = T and ri(F,T ) ≤ M(Fi), and (2) T ≥ ∑M(F j) ⇒ ri(F,T ) =




{(F,T ) ∈ PI : T ≤ ∑M(Fi)}, r is representable by a continuous parametric
function. Therefore, by our definition of a parametric rule, on the entire domain
⋃
I∈N
PI , r is
a parametric rule with a continuous parametric function.
In the deterministic claims problems, each parametric rule is shown by Young (1987a)
to minimize a particular social cost function, and the same result is obtained by Stovall
(2013) for asymmetric parametric rules. The optimality of parametric rules remains true
in the uncertain context. But different from Young (1987a) and Stovall (2013), the objec-
tive function that rationalizes a parametric rule has to admit optimal allocations that do not
necessarily fully allocate a resource when agents have uncertain satiation points. This is
achieved by constructing individual cost function that consists of two parts: one part in-
creases with the assignment, and the other part decreases with the assignment. Moreover,
when agent i’s assignment is no more than the maximal amount determined by the para-
metric rule, an increase of his assignment leads to more decrease in the second part of cost
than the increase in the first. Once agent i receives his maximal assignment, a further in-
crease of his assignment leads to more increase in the first part of cost than the decrease in
the second. Therefore, it is optimal to assign to agent i no more than the maximal amount
specified by the parametric rule. (See the proof of the next theorem for details.)
Theorem 2. A rule r is symmetric, continuous, and consistent if and only if there is a
continuous function H : {(Fi, ti) : Fi ∈ F , ti ∈ [0,Ci]} → R that is strictly convex in
the second variable such that for each I ∈ N and each (F,T ) ∈ PI , r(F,T ) is the unique
solution to the following optimization problem
min
∑
H(Fi, ti) subject to
∑
ti ≤ T and for each i ∈ I, 0 ≤ ti ≤ Ci. (1)
Proof. The “if” direction is readily verified, so we omit the proof. To show the “only
if” direction, let r be a symmetric, continuous, and consistent rule. By Theorem 1, r is
a parametric rule with a continuous parametric function, denoted by f . Without loss of
generality, we can assume that the second variable of f takes values between 0 and 1.1
Thus, f : F × [0, 1] → R is non-decreasing in the second variable satisfying that for each
1See e.g., Remark 1 of Kaminski (2006).
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Fi ∈ F , f (Fi, 0) = 0 and f (Fi, 1) ≤ Ci. Moreover, for each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and
each j ∈ I,
r j(F,T ) := f (F j, α∗), where α∗ ∈ [0, 1] satisfies
∑







For each Fi ∈ F and each ti ∈ [0, f (Fi, 1)], let f −1(Fi, ti) := {α ∈ [0, 1] : f (Fi, α) = ti},
and since f (Fi, ·) is non-decreasing and continuous on [0, 1], f −1(Fi, ti) is a non-empty
closed interval. Define h : {(Fi, ti) : Fi ∈ F , ti ∈ [0,Ci]} → [0, 1] by setting for each Fi ∈ F
and each ti ∈ [0,Ci],
h(Fi, ti) :=
min f
−1(Fi, ti) ti ∈ [0, f (Fi, 1)]
1 + ti− f (Fi,1)Ci− f (Fi,1) ti ∈ ( f (Fi, 1),Ci]
.
It can be readily seen that for each Fi ∈ F , h(Fi, ·) is increasing.










[2 − h(Fi, t′i )]dt′i . (2)
For each Fi ∈ F , since h(Fi, ·) is increasing, H(Fi, ·) is strictly convex. Moreover,
H(Fi, ti) = 2
∫ ti
0
[h(Fi, t′i ) − 1]dt′i +
∫ Ci
0
[2 − h(Fi, t′i )]dt′i . (3)
For each Fi ∈ F , since h(Fi, ti) ≤ 1 when ti ≤ f (Fi, 1) and h(Fi, ti) > 1 when ti > f (Fi, 1),
and since h(Fi, ·) is increasing, H(Fi, ·) is decreasing on [0, f (Fi, 1)] and increasing on
[ f (Fi, 1),Ci].
Let I ∈ N and (F,T ) ∈ PI . Assume that T ≥ ∑ f (Fi, 1). Then r(F,T ) = ( f (Fi, 1))i∈I .
Since for each i ∈ I, H(Fi, ·) is decreasing on [0, f (Fi, 1)] and increasing on [ f (Fi, 1),Ci],
r(F,T ) = ( f (Fi, 1))i∈I is the unique solution to the optimization problem (1).
Assume that T <
∑
f (Fi, 1). Then there is α∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that r(F,T ) = ( f (Fi, α∗))i∈I
with
∑
f (Fi, α∗) = T . First, assume that t∗ solves the optimization problem (1). We show
that
∑
t∗i = T and there is α ∈ [0, 1] such that for each i ∈ I, t∗i = f (Fi, α). To see that∑
t∗i = T , suppose to the contrary that
∑
t∗i < T . Since
∑
t∗i < T <
∑
f (Fi, 1), there is j ∈ I
such that t∗j < f (F j, 1). Then there is t j ∈ (t∗j , f (F j, 1)) such that
∑
i∈I\{ j}
t∗i + t j ≤ T . Since
t j ∈ (t∗j , f (F j, 1)) and H(F j, ·) is decreasing on [0, f (F j, 1)],
∑
i∈I\{ j}
H(Fi, t∗i ) + H(F j, t j) <∑
H(Fi, t∗i ), violating the optimality of t
∗, as desired.
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We check that there is α ∈ [0, 1] such that for each i ∈ I, t∗i = f (Fi, α). Since for each
i ∈ I, H(Fi, ·) is increasing on [ f (Fi, 1),Ci], and since t∗ solves the optimization problem
(1), for each i ∈ I, t∗i ≤ f (Fi, 1), and thus, f −1(Fi, t∗i ) is well-defined. Since for each i ∈ I,
f −1(Fi, t∗i ) is a non-empty closed interval, to show that there is α ∈ [0, 1] such that for each
i ∈ I, t∗i = f (Fi, α), it is sufficient to show that maxi∈I min f
−1(Fi, t∗i ) ≤ mini∈I max f
−1(Fi, t∗i ).
Suppose to the contrary that max
i∈I
min f −1(Fi, t∗i ) > mini∈I max f
−1(Fi, t∗i ). Let j, k ∈ I be such
that min f −1(F j, t∗j) = maxi∈I
min f −1(Fi, t∗i ) and max f
−1(Fk, t∗k) = mini∈I max f
−1(Fi, t∗i ). Since
min f −1(F j, t∗j) > max f
−1(Fk, t∗k), j , k. Let α
′ ∈ [0, 1] be such that min f −1(F j, t∗j) >
α′ > max f −1(Fk, t∗k). Thus, t
∗
j > f (F j, α
′) and f (Fk, α′) > t∗k . Let  > 0 be such that
t∗j −  > f (F j, α′) and f (Fk, α′) > t∗k + . Note that f (F j, 1) ≥ t∗j > t∗j −  > f (F j, α′) ≥
f (F j, 0) = 0 and f (Fk, 1) ≥ f (Fk, α′) > t∗k +  > 0. Thus, f −1(F j, t∗j − ) and f −1(Fk, t∗k + )
are well-defined. Since t∗j −  > f (F j, α′) and f (F j, ·) is non-decreasing, h(F j, t∗j − ) =
min f −1(F j, t∗j−) > α′. Since f (Fk, α′) > t∗k+ and f (Fk, ·) is non-decreasing, h(Fk, t∗k+) =
min f −1(Fk, t∗k + ) < α
′. Since h(F j, t∗j − ) > α′ > h(Fk, t∗k + ) ≥ 0 and  > 0, and since












H(F j, t∗j) + H(Fk, t
∗




[h(F j, t′j) − 1]dt′j − 2
∫ t∗k+
t∗k



















H(Fi, t∗i ), violating the optimality
of t∗, as desired.
Recall that
∑
ri(F,T ) = T and there is α∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that for each i ∈ I, ri(F,T ) =
f (Fi, α∗). Note that
∑
H(Fi, ·) is continuous on {t ∈ RI : ∑ ti ≤ T and for each i ∈ I, 0 ≤ ti ≤
Ci}. Thus, there is a solution to the optimization problem (1). Let t′ denote the solution.
By the previous arguments,
∑
t′i = T and there is α
′ ∈ [0, 1] such that for each i ∈ I,
t′i = f (Fi, α
′). Since for each i ∈ I, f (Fi, ·) is non-decreasing and ∑ ri(F,T ) = ∑ t′i = T ,
r(F,T ) = t′. Therefore, r(F,T ) solves the optimization problem (1). Since
∑
H(Fi, ·) is
strictly convex on {t ∈ RI : ∑ ti ≤ T and for each i ∈ I, 0 ≤ ti ≤ Ci}, r(F,T ) is the unique
solution to the optimization problem (1).
Lastly, to show that H is continuous, let {(Fni , tni )}∞n=1 be a sequence of elements in
{(Fi, ti) : Fi ∈ F , ti ∈ [0,Ci]} such that it converges, in the product topology, to (F∗i , t∗i )
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where F∗i ∈ F and t∗i ∈ [0,C∗i ]. Thus, Fni converges weakly to F∗i , lim cni = c∗i ,
limCni = C
∗













that for each Fi ∈ F and each pair ti, t′i ∈ [0,Ci], h(Fi, ti), h(Fi, t′i ) ∈ [0, 2], and thus, by (3),
|H(Fi, ti) − H(Fi, t′i )| ≤ 2|ti − t′i |. We divide the proof into the following three cases.
Case 1: C∗i = 0. Then limC
n








i ) = 0.
Since lim tni = 0 and limC
n




i ) = lim
∫ tni
0













Case 2: t∗i < C
∗




i − δ. Since limCni = C∗i , for
sufficiently large n ∈ N, C∗i − δ < Cni . Thus, for sufficiently large n ∈ N, h(Fni , ·)
is well-defined on [0,C∗i − δ]. We claim that {h(Fni , ·)} converges pointwise almost ev-
erywhere to h(F∗i , ·) on [0,C∗i − δ]. To see this, let ti ∈ [0,C∗i − δ]. Assume that
ti > f (F∗i , 1). Then h(F
∗
i , ti) = 1 +
ti− f (F∗i ,1)
C∗i − f (F∗i ,1) . Since f is continuous and ti > f (F
∗
i , 1),
for sufficiently large n, ti > f (Fni , 1). Since for sufficiently large n, ti ∈ ( f (Fni , 1),Cni ),
h(Fni , ti) = 1 +
ti− f (Fni ,1)




i , it can be readily seen
that lim h(Fni , ti) = h(F
∗
i , ti), as desired. Assume that ti < f (F
∗
i , 1) and h(F
∗
i , ·) is contin-
uous at ti. Then h(F∗i , ti) = min f
−1(F∗i , ti). Since f is continuous and ti < f (F
∗
i , 1), for
sufficiently large n, ti < f (Fni , 1), so that h(F
n
i , ti) = min f
−1(Fni , ti) ∈ [0, 1]. Let α be
the limit of a convergent subsequence {h(Fnmi , ti)}∞m=1 of the sequence {h(Fni , ti)}. For each
m ∈ N, by the definition of h, f (Fnmi , h(Fnmi , ti)) = ti. Since lim h(Fnmi , ti) = α and f is
continuous, f (F∗i , α) = ti. Since h(F
∗
i , ·) is continuous at ti, f −1(F∗i , ti) is a singleton and
h(F∗i , ti) = α = lim h(F
nm
i , ti). Since each convergent subsequence of {h(Fni , ti)} has the
same limit h(F∗i , ti), lim h(F
n
i , ti) = h(F
∗
i , ti). Since h(F
∗
i , ·) is increasing, there are at most
countably many points in [0, f (F∗i , 1)) at which h(F
∗
i , ·) is not continuous. Since {h(Fni , ·)}
converges pointwise to h(F∗i , ·) on ( f (F∗i , 1),C∗i − δ] and on [0, f (F∗i , 1)) except for at most
countably many points, {h(Fni , ·)} converges pointwise almost everywhere to h(F∗i , ·) on
[0,C∗i − δ].
Since {h(Fni , ·)} converges pointwise almost everywhere to h(F∗i , ·) on [0,C∗i − δ],
and since for sufficiently large n and for each ti ∈ [0,C∗i − δ], h(Fni , ti) ∈ [0, 2],
by Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem, lim
∫ t∗i
0
h(Fni , ti)dti =
∫ t∗i
0




[2 − h(Fni , ti)]dti =
∫ C∗i −δ
t∗i
[2 − h(F∗i , ti)]dti. For each  > 0, let δ ∈ (0, 12 ) be such
that t∗i < C
∗
i − δ. Let N ∈ N be such that for each n ≥ N, C∗i − δ < Cni , |tni − t∗i | ≤ 8 ,
| ∫ t∗i
0
h(Fni , ti)dti −
∫ t∗i
0
h(F∗i , ti)dti| ≤ 8 , |
∫ C∗i −δ
t∗i
[2 − h(Fni , ti)]dti −
∫ C∗i −δ
t∗i
[2 − h(F∗i , ti)]dti| ≤ 8 ,
9
and |Cni −C∗i | ≤ δ. Then for each n ≥ N,
|H(Fni , tni ) − H(F∗i , t∗i )| ≤ |H(Fni , tni ) − H(Fni , t∗i )| + |H(Fni , t∗i ) − H(F∗i , t∗i )|
≤2|tni − t∗i | +
∣∣∣∣∣ ∫ t∗i
0




∣∣∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣∣∣ ∫ C∗i −δ
t∗i




[2 − h(F∗i , ti)]dti
∣∣∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣∣∣ ∫ Cni
C∗i −δ
[2 − h(Fni , ti)]dti
∣∣∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣∣∣ ∫ C∗i
C∗i −δ










+ 2|Cni −C∗i + δ| + 2δ ≤

2
+ 2(|Cni −C∗i | + δ) + 2δ =

2
+ 6δ < .
Hence, lim H(Fni , t
n





Case 3: t∗i = C
∗
i > 0. For each  > 0, let δ ∈ (0, 8 ) be such that t∗i − δ > 0. Since




i − δ > 0, for sufficiently large n ∈ N, tni − δ ≥ 0. Since t∗i − δ < C∗i , by the
result in Case 2, lim H(Fni , t
n
i − δ) = H(F∗i , t∗i − δ). Let N ∈ N be such that for each n ≥ N,
tni − δ ≥ 0 and |H(Fni , tni − δ) − H(F∗i , t∗i − δ)| ≤ 2 . Then for each n ≥ N,
|H(Fni , tni ) − H(F∗i , t∗i )|
≤|H(Fni , tni ) − H(Fni , tni − δ)| + |H(Fni , tni − δ) − H(F∗i , t∗i − δ)| + |H(F∗i , t∗i − δ) − H(F∗i , t∗i )|
≤2δ + 
2










Hence, lim H(Fni , t
n
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